Situational strength is considered one of the most important situational forces at work because it can attenuate the personality–performance relationship. Although organizational scholars have studied the consequences of situational strength, they have paid little attention to its antecedents. To address this gap, the current study focused on situational strength cues from different social sources as antecedents of overall situational strength at work. Specifically, we examined how employees combine situational strength cues emanating from three social sources (i.e., coworkers, the immediate supervisor, (...) and top management). Based on field theory, we hypothesized that the effect of situational strength from coworkers and immediate supervisors (i.e., proximal sources of situational strength) on employees’ perceptions of overall situational strength on the job would be greater than the effect of situational strength from the top management (i.e., the distal source of situational strength). We also hypothesized that the effect of situational strength from the distal source would be mediated by the effects of situational strength from the proximal sources. Data from 363 full-time employees were collected at two time points with a cross-lagged panel design. The first hypothesis was supported for one of the two situational strength facets studied. The second hypothesis was fully supported. (shrink)

The following views were presented at the Annual Meeting of the American Association for the Advancement of Science Seminar “Teaching Ethics in Science and Engineering”, 10–11 February 1993 organized by Stephanie J. Bird , Penny J. Gilmer and Terrell W. Bynum . Opragen Publications thanks the AAAS, seminar organizers and authors for permission to publish extracts from the conference. The opinions expressed are those of the authors and do not reflect the opinions of AAAS or its Board of Directors.

The recent genome sequencing of a non‐vertebrate deuterostome, the ascidian tunicate Ciona intestinalis, makes a substantial contribution to the fields of evolutionary and developmental biology.1 Tunicates have some of the smallest bilaterian genomes, embryos with relatively few cells, fixed lineages and early determination of cell fates. Initial analyses of the C. intestinalis genome indicate that it has been evolving rapidly. Comparisons with other bilaterians show that C. intestinalis has lost a number of genes, and that many genes linked together in (...) most other bilaterians have become uncoupled. In addition, a number of independent, lineage‐specific gene duplications have been detected. These new results, although interesting in themselves, will take on a deeper significance once the genomes of additional invertebrate deuterostomes (e.g. echinoderms, hemichordates and amphioxus) have been sequenced. With such a broadened database, comparative genomics can begin to ask pointed questions about the relationship between the evolution of genomes and the evolution of body plans. BioEssays 25:529–532, 2003. © 2003 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. (shrink)

The history of economic thought has always attracted some of the brightest minds in the discipline. These chroniclers of development have helped form our current views, and it is no surprise that many among them have been at the forefront of new movements in the history of ideas. This notable collection summarizes the work of these key historians of economics and attempts to quantify their impact. Some of the writers covered, such as Friedrich Hayek and Joan Robinson, are already assured (...) of their place among the greatest economists of the twentieth century, but the collection also stresses the influence of those still active in shaping our perceptions - including Mark Blaug, Samuel Hollander and Donald Winch. Written by an impressive roster of contributors, many of whom are themselves well-known in the history of economic thought, this key book features writings from John Creedy, Roger Blackhouse and Neil De Marchi, as well as the editors of the collection as a whole, Warren J. Samuels and Steven Medema. (shrink)

The first English translation of Fichte’s second set of 1804 lectures on the Wissenschaftslehre.

The confusion of categories in Spinoza's ethics, by E. Albee.--Hegel's criticism of Spinoza, by K. E. Gilbert.--Rationalism in Hume's philosophy, by G. H. Sabine.--Freedom as an ethical postulate: Kant, by R. A. Tsanoff.--Mill and Comte, by N. C. Barr.--The intellectualistic voluntarism of Alfred Fouillée, by A. T. Penney.--Hegelianism and the Vedanta, by E. L. Hinman.--Coherence as organization, by G. W. Cunningham.--Time and the logic of monistic idealism, by J. A. Leighton.--The datum, by W. B. Pillsbury.--The limits of the physical, by (...) G. A. de Laguna.--Is the dualism of mind and matter final? By H. W. Wright.--The revolt against dualism, by A. H. Jones. (shrink)

This paper examines the debate between permissive and impermissive forms of Bayesianism. It briefly discusses some considerations that might be offered by both sides of the debate, and then replies to some new arguments in favor of impermissivism offered by Roger White. First, it argues that White’s (Oxford studies in epistemology, vol 3. Oxford University Press, Oxford, pp 161–186, 2010) defense of Indifference Principles is unsuccessful. Second, it contends that White’s (Philos Perspect 19:445–459, 2005) arguments against permissive views do not (...) succeed. (shrink)

Representation theorems are often taken to provide the foundations for decision theory. First, they are taken to characterize degrees of belief and utilities. Second, they are taken to justify two fundamental rules of rationality: that we should have probabilistic degrees of belief and that we should act as expected utility maximizers. We argue that representation theorems cannot serve either of these foundational purposes, and that recent attempts to defend the foundational importance of representation theorems are unsuccessful. As a result, we (...) should reject these claims, and lay the foundations of decision theory on firmer ground. (shrink)

Several variants of Lewis's Best System Account of Lawhood have been proposed that avoid its commitment to perfectly natural properties. There has been little discussion of the relative merits of these proposals, and little discussion of how one might extend this strategy to provide natural property-free variants of Lewis's other accounts, such as his accounts of duplication, intrinsicality, causation, counterfactuals, and reference. We undertake these projects in this paper. We begin by providing a framework for classifying and assessing the variants (...) of the Best System Account. We then evaluate these proposals, and identify the most promising candidates. We go on to develop a proposal for systematically modifying Lewis's other accounts so that they, too, avoid commitment to perfectly natural properties. We conclude by briefly considering a different route one might take to developing natural property-free versions of Lewis's other accounts, drawing on recent work by Williams. (shrink)

In Reasons and Persons, Parfit (1984) posed a challenge: provide a satisfying normative account that solves the Non-Identity Problem, avoids the Repugnant and Absurd Conclusions, and solves the Mere-Addition Paradox. In response, some have suggested that we look toward person-affecting views of morality for a solution. But the person-affecting views that have been offered so far have been unable to satisfy Parfit's four requirements, and these views have been subject to a number of independent complaints. This paper describes a person-affecting (...) account which meets Parfit's challenge. The account satisfies Parfit's four requirements, and avoids many of the criticisms that have been raised against person-affecting views. (shrink)

In “Bayesianism, Infinite Decisions, and Binding”, Arntzenius et al. (Mind 113:251–283, 2004 ) present cases in which agents who cannot bind themselves are driven by standard decision theory to choose sequences of actions with disastrous consequences. They defend standard decision theory by arguing that if a decision rule leads agents to disaster only when they cannot bind themselves, this should not be taken to be a mark against the decision rule. I show that this claim has surprising implications for a (...) number of other debates in decision theory. I then assess the plausibility of this claim, and suggest that it should be rejected. (shrink)

At the heart of the Bayesianism is a rule, Conditionalization, which tells us how to update our beliefs. Typical formulations of this rule are underspecified. This paper considers how, exactly, this rule should be formulated. It focuses on three issues: when a subject’s evidence is received, whether the rule prescribes sequential or interval updates, and whether the rule is narrow or wide scope. After examining these issues, it argues that there are two distinct and equally viable versions of Conditionalization to (...) choose from. And which version we choose has interesting ramifications, bearing on issues such as whether Conditionalization can handle continuous evidence, and whether Jeffrey Conditionalization is really a generalization of Conditionalization. (shrink)

In recent work, Adlam (2022b), Chen & Goldstein (2022), and Meacham (2023) have defended accounts of laws that take laws to be primitive global constraints. A major advantage of these accounts is that they’re able to accommodate the many different kinds of laws that appear in physical theories. In this paper I’ll present these three accounts, highlight their distinguishing features, and note some key differences that might lead one to favor one of these accounts over the others. I’ll conclude by (...) briefly discussing a version of a “constraint” account that I think is especially attractive. (shrink)

It is proved that the relevance logic \ has no structurally complete consistent axiomatic extension, except for classical propositional logic. In fact, no other such extension is even passively structurally complete.

Descartes nimmt in Anspruch, daß sein Argument des Deus malignus über die Einwände der Skeptiker hinausgehe. Was fügt es dem Traumargument hinzu? Die verbreitete Ansicht, der Dämon stelle die Erkenntnis mathematischer und logischer Wahrheiten in Frage, wird im folgenden diskutiert und zurückgewiesen. Die richtige Interpretation lautet: Die Annahme des Dämons unterstützt den Skeptizismus und verstärkt die Zweifel an der Existenz äußerer Objekte. Es werden drei Einwände gegen diese Interpretation erörtert und zurückgewiesen. Eine andere Auffassung vertritt Frankfurt: Die Rolle des Traumarguments (...) sei wesentlich begrenzt; die durch den Dämon aufgeworfenen Zweifel seien umfassender. Eine genaue Analyse der Entwicklung des Traumarguments in der Ersten Meditation führt zur Widerlegung dieser Interpretation. (shrink)

This essay is written on the following premises and argues for them. “Enlightenment” is a word or signifier, and not a single or unifiable phenomenon which it consistently signifies. There is no single or unifiable phenomenon describable as “the Enlightenment,” but it is the definite article rather than the noun which is to be avoided. In studying the intellectual history of the late seventeenth century and the eighteenth, we encounter a variety of statements made, and assumptions proposed, to which the (...) term “Enlightenment” may usefully be applied, but the meanings of the term shift as we apply it. The things are connected, but not continuous; they cannot be reduced to a single narrative; and we find ourselves using the word “Enlightenment” in a family of ways and talking about a family of phenomena, resembling and related to one another in a variety of ways that permit of various generalizations about them. We are not, however, committed to a single root meaning of the word “Enlightenment,” and we do not need to reduce the phenomena of which we treat to a single process or entity to be termed “the” Enlightenment. It is a reification that we wish to avoid, but the structure of our language is such that this is difficult, and we will find ourselves talking of “the French” or “the Scottish,” “the Newtonian” or the “the Arminian” Enlightenments, and hoping that by employing qualifying adjectives we may constantly remind ourselves that the keyword “Enlightenment” is ours to use and should not master us. (shrink)

Turbulent and fast moving markets demand flexible organizations capable of accurate and effective handling of knowledge and information. This article describes some essential parts of this knowledge and information management in Hendrix Voeders Holland, a Dutch feed factory. It concentrates on the Support System, an information technology (IT) application that allows the agricultural advisors to store and retrieve market information in a structured and uniform way, facilitates the information exchange with “headquarters” (e.g., gives the managers access to this information), and (...) makes immediate feedback and action possible. This system was rewarded with the IT Star Award in a worldwide competition of BP Companies. Special attention is given to a part of the Support System: the Daily Reports. In 1989 it was evaluated thoroughly, and the results of this survey are summarized. (shrink)